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1.- Introduction 
Information is everywhere, shaping our discourses and our thoughts. In everyday life, 
we know that the information spread by the media may trigger deep social, economical 
and political changes. In science, the concept of information has pervaded almost all 
scientific disciplines, from physics and chemistry to biology and psychology. 
Philosophy has echoed this situation in a number of articles in journals and books 
devoted to elucidate and analyze the concept of information in its different meanings.  
In the field of the philosophy of physics, Christopher Timpson (2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2008, 2013) has published several works where he accurately designs an 
interpretation of the technical concept of information, that is, of the concept as used in 
information theory. In particular, he proposes a deflationary view about information, 
according to which the term ‘information’ is an abstract noun and, as a consequence, 
information is not part of the material contents of the world. This innovative and well 
articulated view has had a great impact on the philosophy of physics, especially among 
authors interested in the use of the concept of information for interpreting physical 
theories. For this reason, Timpson’s proposal deserves to be critically analyzed in detail, 
in order to assess the consequences usually drawn from it. The main purpose of the 
present article consists precisely in supplying such a critical analysis. 
On this basis, in Section 2 we will begin by recalling certain basic distinctions 
regarding the concept of information: this will allow us to focus on the technical 
statistical concept of information. Then, in Section 3, we will analyze Timpson’s 
reading of Shannon’s theory, considering the conceptual consequences of that reading. 
Section 4 will be devoted to recall and analyze the arguments appealed to by Timpson 
to ground his deflationary view of information; this analysis will lead us to claim that 
information is an item even more abstract than what Timpson claims. This conclusion 
will lead us, in Section 5, to wonder if the abstract nature of information prevents us to 
conceive it as a physical item. The negative answer to this question will allow us to 
consider, in Section 6, the differences between the epistemic and the physical 
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interpretation of information, and to propose, in Section 7, in contrast with Timpson’s 
monist interpretation, a pluralist view about information, according to which, even on 
the basis of a single formalism, the concept of information admits a variety of 
interpretations, each one useful in a different context. 
2.- Which information? 
As many recognize, information is a polysemantic concept that can be associated with 
different phenomena (Floridi 2010). In this conceptual tangle, the first distinction to be 
introduced in philosophy is that between a semantic and a non-semantic view of 
information. According to the first view, information is something that carries semantic 
content (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953; Bar-Hillel 1964, Floridi 2013); it is therefore 
strongly related with semantic notions such as reference, meaning and representation. In 
general, semantic information is carried by propositions that intend to represent states of 
affairs; so, it has intentionality, “aboutness”, that is, it is directed to other things. And 
although it remains controversial whether false factual content may qualify as 
information, semantic information maintains strong links with the notion of truth. 
Non-semantic information, also called ‘mathematical’ or ‘statistical’, is concerned 
with the statistical properties of a system and/or the correlations between the states of 
two systems, independently of the meanings of those states. The classical locus of 
mathematical information is the paper where Claude Shannon (1948) introduces a 
precise formalism designed to solve certain specific technological problems. Shannon’s 
theory is purely quantitative: it ignores any issue related to informational content: “[the] 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The 
significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible 
messages.” (Shannon 1948, p. 379). 
Although very widespread (see also Floridi 2013, Adriaans 2013), the distinction 
between semantic and non-semantic information is not considered by Timpson. 
According to the author, the first and most important distinction is that between the 
everyday notion of information and the technical concept of information, such as that 
derived from the work of Shannon (Timpson 2004, pp. 4-5).1 The everyday notion of 
information is intimately associated with the concepts of knowledge, language and 
                                                 
1
 Here we will always refer to Timpson’s PhD dissertation at the University of Oxford (Timpson 
2004), and not to the published version (Timpson 2013), because the dissertation was the original 
source of the great impact of Timpson’s proposal. 
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meaning; information in the everyday sense displays intentionality, it is directed 
towards something, it is about something. By contrast, a technical concept of 
information is specified by means of a mathematical and/or physical vocabulary and, 
prima facie, has at most limited and derivative links to semantic and epistemic concepts.  
In turn, the semantic view of information and the philosophers interested in it are 
barely mentioned in Timpson’s work. One exception is given by his analysis of Fred 
Dretske’s proposal: “The claim that the everyday and information-theoretic notions of 
information are to be kept distinct is defended against the view of Dretske (1981), who 
sought to base a semantic notion of information on Shannon’s theory.” (Timpson 2004, 
p. v). 2  This quote and others −“Does this establish a link between the technical 
communication-theoretic notions of information and a semantic, everyday one?” (ibid. 
p. 36)− suggest that Timpson equates the semantic and the everyday views of 
information. This suspicion is reinforced by the fact that the everyday concept is 
endowed with the same features as those traditionally used to characterize semantic 
information. In this way, Timpson seems to deprive the semantic view of any technical 
status, in opposition to many authors who are convinced that the elucidation of a 
technical concept of semantic information, with its links with knowledge, meaning and 
reference, makes philosophical sense (Dretske 1981, Barwise and Seligman 1997, 
Floridi 2013). As will be pointed out in the next sections, Timpson’s explicit 
estrangement from any semantic ingredient in the concept of information stands in 
tension with some of his further claims. 
Whereas Timpson devotes a couple of pages to the everyday notion of 
information and its relation with knowledge (2004, pp. 5-9), he announces that, since he 
is concerned with quantum and classical information theories, his work addresses the 
technical concept of information. He also stresses from the beginning that, although 
there are different technical concepts of information other than Shannon’s (Fisher 
                                                 
2
 Timpson (2004, pp. 34-39) offers a criticism of Dretske’s position based on pointing out a formal 
error. However, the error can be consistently remediated and the core of Dretske’s proposal still 
deserves to be considered (see Lombardi 2005). Moreover, Timpson clasifies Dretske (1981) as a 
“semantic naturalizer”, that is, one of those philosophers who “hope, or expect, to achieve the 
reduction of semantic and related concepts to respectable physical ones” (ibid. p. 30). But 
Dretske’s purpose is to formulate a semantic theory of information by endowing the formalism of 
Shannon’s theory (adequately adapted to deal with individual events) with semantic content, in 
order to explain sensory and cognitive processes in informational terms. Therefore, it is not clear at 
all that this purpose amounts to the attempt to reduce semantic concepts to physical ones: sensory 
and cognitive processes are not semantic items, and Shannon formalism is not, in principle, a 
physical theory. 
 4
information, algorithmic information, etc.), he will focus on the best known technical 
concept of information, the Shannon information, along with some closely related 
concepts from quantum information theory. So, let us begin by recalling the basic 
notions of Shannon’s theory. 
3.- Timpson on Shannon’s theory 
According to Shannon (1948; see also Shannon and Weaver 1949), a general 
communication system consists of five parts:  
− A source S, which generates the message to be received at the destination. 
− A transmitter T, which turns the message generated at the source into a signal to be 
transmitted. In the cases in which the information is codified, encoding is also 
implemented by this system. 
− A channel CH, that is, the medium used to transmit the signal from the transmitter to 
the receiver. 
− A receiver R, which reconstructs the message from the signal. 
− A destination D, which receives the message. 
The source S is a system with a range of possible states 1,..., ns s  usually called 
letters, whose respective probabilities of occurrence are 1( ),..., ( )np s p s . S produces 
sequences of states, usually called messages. The entropy of the source S is defined as 
1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
n
i i
i
H S p s p s
=
=∑        (1) 
Analogously, the destination D is a system with a range of possible states 1,..., md d , 
with respective probabilities 1( ),..., ( )mp d p d . The entropy of the destination D is 
defined as 
1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
m
j j
j
H D p d p d
=
=∑       (2) 
When ‘log’ is the logarithm to the base 2, the resulting unit of measurement for ( )H S  
and ( )H D  is called ‘bit’, contraction of binary unit. If the natural logarithm is used, the 
unit of measurement is the nat, contraction of natural unit, and in the case of the 
logarithm to base 10, the unit is the Hartley. 
The channel CH is defined by the matrix ( )j ip d s   , where ( )j ip d s  is the 
conditional probability of the occurrence of the state jd  at the destination D given the 
occurrence of the state is  at the source S, and the elements in any row must add up to 1. 
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The relationship between ( )H S  and ( )H D  can be represented as follows: 
       ( ; )H S D : mutual information 
       E : equivocation 
       N : noise 
The mutual information ( ; )H S D  is the information generated at the source S and 
received at the destination D: 
( ; ) ( ) ( )H S D H S E H D N= − = −       (3) 
E is the information generated at S but not received at D, and N is the information 
received at D but not generated at S. Equivocation E and noise N are measures of the 
dependence between source and destination and, therefore, are functions not only of S 
and R, but also of the channel CH. Thus, they are computed as 
1 1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
n m
i j i j i
i j
N p s p d s p d s
= =
=∑ ∑      (4) 
1 1
( ) ( ) log(1 ( ))
m n
j i j i j
j i
E p d p s d p s d
= =
=∑ ∑      (5) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j j i i jp s d p d s p s p d= . The channel capacity C is defined as: 
( )max ( ; )ip sC H S D=         (6) 
where the maximum is taken over all the possible distributions ( )ip s  at the source. C is 
the largest amount of information that can be transmitted over the communication 
channel CH. 
One of the most relevant results in Shannon’s theory is the noiseless coding 
theorem (or First Shannon Theorem), according to which the value of the entropy 
( )H S  of the source is equal to the average number of symbols necessary to code a letter 
of the source using an ideal code: ( )H S  measures the optimal compression of the 
source messages. In fact, the messages of N letters produced by S fall into two classes: 
one of approximately ( )2NH S  typical messages, and the other of atypical messages. 
When N → ∞ , the probability of an atypical message becomes negligible; so, the 
source can be conceived as producing only ( )2NH S  possible messages. This suggests a 
natural strategy for coding: each typical message is coded by a binary sequence of 
length ( )NH S , in general shorter than the length N  of the original message. 
H(S) H(D) 
H(S;D) E N 
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In turn, the noisy coding theorem (or Second Shannon Theorem) proves that the 
information transmitted over a communication channel can be increased without 
increasing the probability of error as long as the communication rate is maintained 
below the channel capacity. In other words, the channel capacity is equal to the 
maximum rate at which the information can be sent over the channel and recovered at 
the destination with a vanishingly low probability of error. 
Up to this point, the entropies ( )H S  and ( )H D  were not yet associated with the 
word ‘information’; nevertheless, it is clear that they play the role of measures of 
information in Shannon’s theory. But, what is information? In many presentations of the 
theory, ( )H S  and ( )H D  are defined directly in terms of the probabilities of the states 
of the source and the destination and, therefore, they are conceived as measures of the 
information generated at the source and received at the destination, respectively. This is 
Shannon’s strategy, who was interested in the engineering problem of transmitting very 
long messages with low probability of error. However, from a conceptual viewpoint, it 
makes sense to ask for the information generated at the source by the occurrence of one 
of its states. Moreover, since eqs. (1) and (2) have the form of a weighted average, it 
also makes sense to define the individual magnitudes on which the average is computed. 
Therefore, the amount of information ( )iI s  generated at the source by the occurrence of 
is  and the amount of information ( )jI d  received at the destination by the occurrence of 
jd  can be expressed as 
( ) log(1 ( ))i iI s p s=         (7) 
( ) log(1 ( ))j jI d p d=         (8) 
When defined by eqs. (1) and (2), ( )H S  and ( )H D  cannot be conceived as average 
amounts of information to the extent that individual amounts of information were not 
previously defined. But once ( )iI s  and ( )jI d  are introduced, the entropies ( )H S  and 
( )H D  turn out to be average amounts of information per letter generated by the source 
and received by the destination, respectively, and can be defined as (see, e.g., Abramson 
1963, p. 12; Lombardi 2005, pp. 24-25; Bub 2007, p. 558) 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
n
i i
i
H S p s I s
=
=∑         (9) 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
n
j j
i
H D p d I d
=
=∑        (10) 
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The distinction between conceiving the entropies of the source and the destination 
as amounts of information or as average amounts of information might seem an 
irrelevant detail. However, this is not the case when we are interested in elucidating the 
very notion of information −in Shannon’s sense−. In fact, Timpson takes the first 
strategy and does not define the amount of information generated by a single letter of 
the source: “It is crucial to realise that ‘information’ in Shannon’s theory is not 
associated with individual messages, but rather characterises the source of the 
messages.” (Timpson 2004, p. 11). In the few cases in which he speaks about the 
information that we would gain if the state is  were to occur (Timpson 2003, pp. 13-14), 
it is conceived as a “surprise information” associated with is , which only makes sense 
when is  is the outcome of a single experiment considered as a member of a long 
sequence of experiments −where, apparently, the probabilities are conceived as 
frequencies−. 
Assuming the conceptual priority of ( )H S  over individual amounts of 
information allows Timpson to define the concept of information in terms of the 
noiseless coding theorem: “the coding theorems that introduced the classical (Shannon, 
1948) and quantum (Schumacher, 1995) concepts of informationt [the technical concept 
of information] do not merely define measures of these quantities. They also introduce 
the concept of what it is that is transmitted, what it is that is measured.” (Timpson 2008, 
p. 23; emphasis in the original).3 In other words, Shannon information measures “the 
minimal amount of channel resources required to encode the output of the source in 
such a way that any message produced may be accurately reproduced at the destination. 
That is, to ask how much informationt a source produces is ask to what degree is the 
output of the source compressible?” (Timpson 2008, p. 27; emphasis in the original). In 
the same vein, Timpson relates mutual information with the noisy coding theorem: “The 
most important interpretation of the mutual information does derive from the noisy 
coding theorem.” (2004, p. 19). 
The first thing to notice here is that the strategy of defining information via the 
noiseless coding theorem turns the theorem into a definition. In fact, now the entropy 
( )H S  of the source is not defined by eq. (1) as the average amount of information per 
letter generated by the source, but it is defined as the average number of bits necessary 
                                                 
3
 Although in Section 1.2 of his thesis Timpson considers two other interpretations of Shannon 
information, from the whole text it turns out to be clear that the one based on the noiseless theorem 
is considered as the most relevant, and that the others are subsidiary to that one. 
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to code a letter of the source using an ideal code, and eq. (1) becomes a theorem 
resulting from a mathematical proof. Of course, there is no formal mistake in this 
strategy, but it causes a kind of uneasiness when considered from a conceptual 
viewpoint. 
In fact, if the noiseless coding theorem says what it is that is transmitted, now we 
know what ( )H S  is. But what about ( )H D ? If information is defined through the 
noiseless coding theorem, either ( )H D  does not represent information, or it is defined 
by eq. (2), breaking down the symmetry between eqs. (1) and (2) as the basic definitions 
of the theory. Moreover, if information is defined in terms of an ideal codification, what 
happens in the case of non-ideal codifications? Can we still say that a same amount of 
information can be better or worse codified?  
As said above, the coding theorem is demonstrated in the case of very long 
messages, strictly speaking, for messages of length N → ∞ . Thus, it says nothing about 
the relation between the information ( )iI s  generated at the source by the occurrence of 
the state is  and the length of the binary sequence used to codify it. Therefore, if the 
noiseless coding theorem embodies the very nature of information, ( )iI s  is deprived of 
its meaning as an individual amount of information. Not only that, but one wonders 
whether short binary messages can be conceived as embodying information to the 
extent that they are not covered by the noiseless coding theorem. 
The fact that the entropy ( )H S  can be expressed in different units of 
measurement (bits, nats, Hartleys, etc.), and that the messages of the source can be 
coded using different sets of symbols (Q-ary alphabets), also points to the conceptual 
difference between the amount of information associated with the occurrence of a state 
of the source and the number of binary symbols necessary to codify that event. In fact, 
one could measure the entropy ( )H S  of the source in Hartleys but codify the messages 
with a coding alphabet of two symbols, or measure ( )H S  in bits but codify the 
messages with a coding alphabet of ten symbols. In these cases, the result of the 
noiseless coding theorem has to be adapted by introducing the necessary change of 
measurement units. Of course, this might not be convenient from a practical viewpoint, 
but has nothing to do with the meaning of the concept of information. This situation is 
analogous to measuring a length in meters and decimeters, but then expressing it in a 
hexadecimal numerical system: this fact does not affect the meaning of the very concept 
of length. 
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When explaining the elements of the general communication system, Shannon 
(1948, p. 381) characterizes the transmitter as a system that operates on the message 
coming from the source in some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over 
the channel. In many cases, such as in telegraphy, the transmitter is also responsible for 
encoding the source messages. However, in certain cases the message is not codified. 
For instance, in traditional telephony the transmitter operates as a mere transducer, by 
changing sound pressure into a proportional electrical current. If one insists on defining 
information in terms of the noiseless coding theorem, how should one talk about 
information in those situations where no coding is involved?  
None of these observations is an insurmountable criticism against defining 
information via the noiseless coding theorem. However, this definitional move conflates 
two aspects of communication that the traditional textbooks warned us not to 
conceptually confuse: the information generated at the source, which depends on its 
states and the probability distribution over them and is independent of coding −even of 
the very fact that the messages are coded or not−, and the number of symbols necessary 
to codify the occurrence of those states, which also depends on the alphabet used for 
codification. For Timpson, the conflation of these two aspects is not a serious problem 
to the extent that, as we will see in the next section, his deflationary position renders the 
concept of information void of any content other than referring to the entire protocol 
involved in communication.  
4.- The deflationary interpretation of information 
Timpson (2004, p.2) introduces a quote by Peter Strawson as the epigraph of the first 
part of his now famous PhD thesis: “To suppose that, whenever we use a singular 
substantive, we are, or ought to be, using it to refer to something, is an ancient, but no 
longer a respectable, error.” (Strawson 1950, p. 448). And, immediately at the 
beginning of that section, he recalls a quote by John L. Austin: “For ‘truth’ itself is an 
abstract noun, a camel, that is of a logical construction, which cannot get past the eye 
even of a grammarian. We approach it cap and categories in hand: we ask ourselves 
whether Truth is a substance (the Truth, the Body of Knowledge), or a quality 
(something like the colour red, inhering in truths), or a relation (‘correspondence’). But 
philosophers should take something more nearly their own size to strain at. What needs 
discussing rather is the use, or certain uses, of the word ‘true’.” (Austin 1950, p. 25). 
By relying on the analogy between ‘truth’ and ‘information’, Timpson takes these 
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quotes to support his claim that ‘information’ is an abstract noun: “Austin’s aim was to 
de-mystify the concept of truth, and make it amenable to discussion, by pointing to the 
fact that ‘truth’ is an abstract noun. So too is ‘information’.” (Timpson 2004, p. 3). So, 
much of the plausibility of that claim depends on the reliability of the analogy. 
Strawson’s and Austin’s quotes are taken from a well-known debate between the 
authors about the concept of truth. Whereas Austin intended to vindicate the 
correspondence theory of truth by reconstructing it in terms of certain demonstrative 
and descriptive conventions, Strawson took a deflationary stance according to which the 
predicate ‘is true’ has a performative rather than a descriptive function. In turn, the 
whole debate is framed in a semantic context in which truth is a prototypical semantic 
notion and the predicate ‘is true’ belongs to the metalanguage. Nothing of this sort 
happens in the case of the notion of information: in principle it is not one of the 
semantic concepts that have been traditionally analyzed by the philosophy of language, 
and it does not belong to a metalanguage that speaks about another language −object 
language−. On the other hand, the discussions about abstract nouns in general focus on 
the relation between the abstract-concrete dichotomy and the universal-particular 
dichotomy, on abstraction as the operation of removing particular features, on the 
different kinds of abstract nouns −those referring to mathematical entities, those derived 
from nominalization of adjectives or verbs, those naming fictional characters or musical 
or literary compositions, etc.−, among other issues; however, the semantic notion of 
truth does not appear in those discussions since it involves peculiar difficulties that are 
completely alien to the abstract-concrete question. Therefore, the appeal to the analogy 
with truth to argue for the abstract character of the word ‘information’ sounds as a 
forced analogy in the context of the philosophy of language. 
Timpson recalls that very often abstract nouns arise as nominalizations of various 
adjectival or verbal forms. On this basis, he extends the analogy between truth and 
information: “Austin leads us from the substantive ‘truth’ to the adjective ‘true’. 
Similarly, ‘information’ is to be explained in terms of the verb ‘inform’” (Timpson 2004, 
p. 3). But, what does ‘to inform’ mean? “To inform someone is to bring them to know 
something (that they did not already know).” (ibid. p. 3). In other words, the meaning of 
‘information’ is given by the operation of bringing knowledge. However, as pointed out 
above, later in the text we are said that only the everyday concept of information has 
meaningful links with knowledge; thus, the analogy with truth and the transition from 
the verb ‘inform’ to the noun ‘information’ only applies to the everyday concept: 
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“‘Information’ in the technical sense is evidently not derived from a nominalization of 
this verb.” (ibid. p. 20). Therefore, the reason why ‘information’, in its technical sense, 
is an abstract noun is not given yet, and must be based on a further argument. In fact, 
immediately below, Timpson gives not one, but two arguments. 
The first argument relies on defining Shannon information as a measure of the 
compressibility of messages (on the basis of the First Shannon Theorem) and mutual 
information as a measure of the capacity of the channel (on the basis of the Second 
Shannon Theorem) (Timpson 2004, p. 21). Of course, these definitions favor the claim 
that information in its technical sense is an abstract item. However, as argued in the 
previous section, the entropy of the source can be defined as the average amount of 
information produced at the source without reference to coding (see eqs. (1) or (9)), and 
the strategy of defining information via the noiseless coding theorem can be objected 
for different reasons. Analogously, mutual information can be defined as the 
information generated at the source and received by the destination without reference to 
the capacity of the channel (see eqs. (3), (4) and (5)), which, in turn, can be defined in 
terms of the mutual information as usual (see eq. (6)). These definitions of the concepts 
of Shannon entropy and mutual information, are different from those proposed by 
Timpson: taking eq. (1) and eq. (3) as the definitions of Shannon entropy and mutual 
information respectively, as usual, is compatible with interpretations of the technical 
concept of information which are different from the “abstract-noun” reading, in 
particular, with a physical interpretation of information (we will come back to this issue 
in Section 6). The point to emphasize here is that, in this first argument offered by 
Timpson, the conclusion about the abstract nature of information −in its technical 
sense− is a direct consequence of the previous decision about the way in which the 
relevant magnitudes are defined. In other words, this argument retrieves from the 
definition what was injected in it from the very beginning. 
The second and best known argument relies on the philosophical distinction 
between types and tokens. Let us consider that the source produces the sequence of 
states 8 5 1 2 2 4 7 7 2 9 3 1, , , , , ,..., , , ,..., , ,s s s s s s s s s s s s . According to Timpson, what we want to 
transmit is not the sequence of states itself, but another token of the same type: “one 
should distinguish between the concrete systems that the source outputs and the type 
that this output instantiates.” (Timpson 2004, p. 22; see also Timpson 2008). The goal 
of communication, then, is to reproduce at the destination another token of the same 
type: “What will be required at the end of the communication protocol is either that 
 12
another token of this type actually be reproduced at a distant point” (Timpson 2008, p. 
25). Once this claim is accepted, the argument runs easily: since the information 
produced by the source, that we desire to transmit, is the sequence type, not the token, 
and types are abstract, then information is abstract and ‘information’ is an abstract noun 
(see Timpson 2004, pp. 21-22; see also 2008).  
Of course, this argumentative strategy allows Timpson to dissolve many problems 
involved in the transmission of information, in particular those related with 
communication based on entanglement. For instance, in teleportation it is said that the 
very large −potentially infinite− amount of information required to specify the 
teletransported state is transferred from the source to the destination by sending only 
two classical bits and without a physical channel between them. This has lead many 
physicists to search for the physical link that can play the role of the carrier of 
information: for some, the information travels backwards in time to the event at which 
the entangled pair was produced and then travels forwards to the future (Penrose 1998; 
Jozsa 1998, 2004); for others, the information travels hidden in the classical bits 
(Deutsch and Hayden 2000). With his abstract-noun interpretation of information, 
Timpson cuts the Gordian knot of teletransportation: “Once it is recognized that 
‘information’ is an abstract noun, then it is clear that there is no further question to be 
answered regarding how information is transmitted in teleportation that goes beyond 
providing a description of the physical processes involved in achieving the aim of the 
protocol.” (Timpson 2006, p. 599). 
Although very convincing at first sight, the argument deserves to be examined in 
detail. If information is abstract because it is the type transmitted, and information can 
be measured, what is the measure of a type? In turn, is it true that the goal of 
communication (in the context of Shannon’s theory) is to reproduce at the destination a 
token of the same type produced at the source? As Shannon stresses, in communication, 
“[t]he significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible 
messages.” (1948, p. 379; emphasis in the original). The states jd  of the destination 
system D can be any kind of states, completely different than the states is  of the source 
system S: the goal of communication is to identify at the destination which sequence of 
states is  was produced by the source. Timpson explains that “if the source X produces a 
string of letters like the following: 2 1 3 1 4 2 1 7 1 4, , , , ,..., , , , ,x x x x x x x x x x , say, then the type is 
the sequence ‘ 2 1 3 1 4 2 1 7 1 4, , , , ,..., , , , ,x x x x x x x x x x ’; we might name this ‘sequence 17’. The 
aim is to produce at the receiving end of the communication channel another token of 
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this type. What has been transmitted, though, the information transmitted on this run of 
the protocol, is sequence 17.” (2004, pp. 21-22). But this is not the case: what has been 
transmitted is not sequence 17, but that sequence 17 is the actual message selected from 
the set of the possible messages of the source. Indeed, the fact that sequence 17 was 
produced in the source can be identified by means of the occurrence in D of a sequence 
7 4 3 4 5 7 4 7 4 5, , , , ,..., , , , ,d d d d d d d d d d , which can hardly be regarded as a token of the type 
‘ 2 1 3 1 4 2 1 7 1 4, , , , ,..., , , , ,x x x x x x x x x x ’. Therefore, in principle the sequences of the source 
and of the destination do not need to be tokens of the same type in any sense that does 
not empty the very philosophical distinction type-token of any content. 
Somebody who seems to suspect that there is something odd in Timpson’s 
argument is Armond Duwell. After publishing an article to argue that quantum 
information is not different from classical information (Duwell 2003), Duwell changes 
his mind under the influence of Timpson’s works. So, in a later article he also takes into 
account the distinction between types and tokens, which, roughly speaking, “is the 
distinction between kinds of things and their concrete instances, respectively.” (Duwell 
2008, p. 199). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that: “To describe the success criterion of 
Shannon’s theory as being the reproduction of the tokens produced at the information 
source at the destination is unacceptable because it lacks the precision required of a 
success criterion.” (ibid., p. 199). The reasons are several. First, any token is a token of 
many different types simultaneously; so the type-token argument leaves undetermined 
the supposedly transmitted type (ibid. p. 199). Moreover, in Shannon’s theory the 
success criterion is given by a one-one mapping from the set of letters that characterize 
the source to the set of letters that characterize the destination, and this mapping is 
completely arbitrary (ibid. p. 200). Later Duwell notes that the Shannon entropy 
associated with a source can change due to the change of the probability distribution 
describing the source, without the change of the types that the source produces tokens of 
(ibid. p. 202). Moreover, the types a source produces tokens of can change without the 
Shannon entropy of the source changing (ibid. 203). 
We might suppose that all these correct observations are sufficient to lead Duwell 
to conclude that the technical concept of information cannot be characterized in terms of 
the type-token distinction. However, this is not the conclusion drawn by him. On the 
contrary, he develops a number of distinctions and arguments to retain Timpson’s 
characterization of information. In particular, Duwell distinguishes the success of 
communication from the goal of communication, which “is to produce, at the 
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destination, a token of the type produced by the information source. For example, if the 
information source produces a sequence of letters, the destination ought to produce the 
same sequence of letters.” (Duwell 2008, p. 199). In this way, he retains Timpson’s 
proposal at the cost of introducing a notion, the goal of communication, which is absent 
in Shannon’s original theory. 
Moreover, Duwell considers that the one-to-one mapping that determines the 
success criterion in Shannon’s theory “establishes an identity between the symbols that 
characterize the source and destination […]. In other words, this function establishes 
the appropriate conditions for token instantiation of the type that the information source 
produced tokens of.” (Duwell 2008, p. 200). But, as stressed above, the mapping is 
completely arbitrary, and the states of the source and the states of the destination may be 
of a completely different nature: for instance, the source may be a dice and the 
destination a dash of lights; or the source may be a device that produces words in 
English and the destination a device that operates a machine. It is difficult to say in what 
sense a face of a dice and a light in a dash are tokens of a same type: which is the type 
in this case? The fact that any token is a token of different types does not mean that any 
two things arbitrarily chosen can always be conceived as tokens of the same type. As 
stressed above, admitting arbitrary functions as defining the relation “x is a token of the 
same type as the token y” deprives the distinction type-token of any philosophical 
content and conceptual usefulness (see Wetzel 2011). 
In his argumentative effort to retain the relevance of the type-token relationship to 
the elucidation of the nature of information −in its technical sense−, Duwell recalls the 
distinction, introduced by Timpson (2004, pp. 20-21), between Shannon quantity-
information, which “is that which is quantified by the Shannon entropy” (Duwell 2008, 
p. 201), and Shannon type-information, which “is what is produced at the information 
source that is required to be reproduced at the destination.” (ibid., p. 201). However, 
far from elucidating the technical concept of information, this distinction makes clear 
that the information usually measured in bits, and which engineers are really interested 
in, is the quantity-information, which is not a type and has nothing to do with types and 
tokens. In other words, the information in its technical sense, referred to by Shannon’s 
theory, is the quantity-information. The notion of type-information introduced by 
Timpson does not correspond to the technical concept of information because, 
according to Shannon’s theory, successful communication does not require that the 
states of source and destination are tokens of the same type.  
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The philosophical distinction between types and tokens, although not confined to 
logic and philosophy of language, finds its paradigmatic example in the difference 
between a proposition and its concrete sentence utterances: “one will distinguish in the 
standard way between the sentence tokens inscribed and what is said by the sentences: 
the propositions expressed.” (Timpson 2004, p. 22). This is a difference we have 
learned when studying logico-semantic topics, in order to avoid the confusion between 
the concrete instance of a sentence and its semantic content expressed by the 
proposition. Of course, when Timpson introduces the idea of type-information, he is not 
endowing types with meaning. However, a type needs to have some content to be able 
to identify its tokens: the distinction between types and tokens is not merely formal or 
syntactic. On the contrary, Shannon information is neutral with respect to any content, 
since the only relevant issue is the selection of a message among many. It seems that, 
although Timpson explicitly keeps distance from endowing information with any 
semantic content, certain semantic notions creeps up into his argumentation, in such a 
way that his concept of information turns out to acquire a sort of content completely 
alien to Shannon’s original proposal. 
Summing up, the arguments developed by Timpson in favor of the abstract nature 
of information are not conclusive. Nevertheless, the task of analyzing them has led us to 
notice that information in Shannon’s theory is even more abstract than types. But, in 
Timpson’s general argumentation, the abstract nature of information is the cornerstone 
of his claim that information is not physical. Therefore, it seems that, from a different 
argumentative line, we should arrive at the same conclusion. However, this is not the 
case, as we will see in the next section. 
5.- Why is information not physical? 
According to Timpson, in the transmission of information what is transmitted is a type 
sequence, and “types are abstracta. They are not themselves part of the contents of the 
material world, nor do they have a spatio-temporal location.” (Timpson 2008, p. 27; 
emphasis in the original). Since ‘information’ is an abstract noun, “it doesn’t serve to 
refer to a material thing or substance.” (Timpson 2004, p. 20). Therefore, “one should 
not understand the transmission of information on the model of transporting potatoes, 
or butter, say, or piping water.” (2008, p. 31). 
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The claim that information is not a substance or a kind of stuff is repeated many 
times in Timpson’s works (see, e.g., 2004, p. 34, 2008, p. 28). Even accepting that 
information is not a substance, one can still ask about its existence: Does information 
exist? Timpson does not offer a single answer to this question. Sometimes, he claims 
that his position does not imply nominalism: although information is an abstractum, 
there is no need to conclude thereby that it does not exist, since many abstracta are very 
often usefully said to exist. From a non-nominalist position, “a sufficient condition for 
type existence will be that there be facts about whether particular concrete objects 
would or would not be tokens of that type.” (2008, p. 28). Nevertheless, the quote from 
Strawson that opens his PhD thesis seems to suggest something different, when pointing 
out that to assume that any noun refers to something is “an ancient, but no longer a 
respectable, error” (2004, p. 2). One could suppose that the idea that ‘information’ is a 
non-referring term, although present in his first works, disappears in his more recent 
publications. However, this is not the case. In his paper about teleportation we can read 
that “there is not a question of information being a substance or entity that is 
transported, nor of ‘the information’ being a referring term.” (2006, p. 599), and the 
quote from Strawson is still there in his very recent book (2013, p. 10). This means that 
it is not only that information is not a material thing or a substance, but that there is 
nothing that counts as the reference of the term ‘information’. 
In any case, the final aim of Timpson’s argumentation about the abstract nature of 
information consists in denying the physical interpretation of information. For him, the 
dictum ‘Information is physical’, applied to the technical concept of information, if not 
trivial −meaning that some physically defined quantity is physical−, is false precisely 
because ‘information’ is an abstract noun. And this leads to all the consequences 
pointed out above: information is not a stuff or a substance, it is not located in space and 
time, it is not material. The question is: are these features sufficient to say that 
information is not physical? 
There is, certainly, a previous question: what does it mean to be a physical item? 
In Timpson’s arguments, the physical world seems to be given once and for all, 
independently of science. The style of his argumentation is typical of the traditional 
analytical philosophy of language: the physical world is what ordinary language talks 
about and, consequently, we discover the world’s structure by analyzing the grammar of 
that language. For this reason, the grammatical fact that a noun is abstract expresses the 
non-existence of its referent in the physical world. It is true that Timpson distinguishes 
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between the everyday notion and the technical notion of information. Nevertheless, in 
both cases the strategy is the same: to analyze the grammatical role played by the word 
‘information’ in the non-formal language, and to draw ontological conclusions from that 
analysis. However, it is hard to suppose that physicists appeal to that strategy to decide 
what is a physical item when they say, as Rolf Landauer (1991, 1996), that information 
is physical. If one does not want to turn the structure of non-formal languages into the 
clue witness about what exists and does not exist in the physical world, a more 
reasonable strategy seems to be to admit that the physical world is the world that 
physics talks about. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not a certain item belongs 
to the physical world, it is necessary to see what role it plays in physical science. 
From this perspective, the first thing to notice is that it is not necessary to be a 
substance, or a concrete thing, or a material entity, to be physical. The realm of physics 
is populated by countless properties, usually referred to as ‘observables’, which are not 
substances nor concrete or material things. In fact, physical properties as position, 
velocity, charge, mass, etc. are abstracta, and many of them cannot be conceived as 
existing in space and time in any meaningful sense: what is the space-time location of 
position? Nonetheless, they inhabit the world described by physics, they are 
undoubtedly physical items. Pace Timpson, only from an extreme nominalist 
perspective can the existence of physical properties be called into question. It could be 
argued that, whereas position and electric charge are properties, information is not a 
property. But the decision about conceiving a noun belonging to particular physical 
theory as naming an individual entity, a stuff or a property is not fixed by grammar, but 
depends on the interpretation of the particular theory considered. In any case, it is not 
necessary to be a substance or a material determinate thing to be a physical item. 
From a philosophical perspective, it is well known that physics, far from being a 
static body of knowledge, changes substantially through history. In this process, 
concepts undergo deep mutations that modify the worldview described by physics. Let 
us consider, for instance, the concept of a wave, which begins by referring to a property 
of a physical medium: a wave is nothing else than an abstract description of how a 
material medium changes its properties in space and/or in time. In this sense, the 
concept of a wave does not belong to the category of substance, but to the category of 
property: there are no waves without a material medium that carries them. However, 
with the development of physics waves become something that do not need an 
underlying material substratum to exist. Although at present the ontological status of a 
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field is still under debate, it is agreed that a field is something that exists by itself, with 
no need of a material medium, and that has its own properties and its specific physical 
description (for a historical account of this transformation, see Berkson 1974). 
The example of waves shows that physics, in its evolution, tends to perform a 
substantialization of certain concepts4: from originally being conceived as properties, 
certain magnitudes turn into substances, but not in the sense of becoming kinds of stuff, 
referents of mass nouns −the sense used by Timpson−, but in the Aristotelian sense 
(“primary substance” in Categories) of being objects of predication but not predicable 
of anything else, and being bearers of properties (see Robinson 2014). One might 
wonder whether the −technical− concept of information is undergoing a mutation 
analogous to that experienced by the concept of waves, and is beginning to be 
conceived as a physical magnitude that exists by itself, without the need of a material 
carrier supporting it. 
A concept that immediately comes to one’s mind when thinking about a physical 
interpretation of information is that of energy, since energy also seems to be something 
“abstract” and non-material, at least when compared to, say, a molecule. Timpson 
considers the analogy between information and energy, but assumes that, by contrast to 
‘information’, ‘energy’ is a property name. In the context of this analogy, he asks 
whether information is “adventitious”, that is, added from without, from the perspective 
of the pragmatic interest of an agent: “Is it a fundamental one? […] Or is it an 
adventitious one: of the nature of an addition from without; an addition from the 
parochial perspective of an agent wishing to treat some system information-
theoretically, for whatever reason?” (Timpson 2008, pp. 46-47; emphasis in the 
original). Also with respect to this aspect the comparison with energy is relevant. In fact, 
in the context of strict Newtonian mechanics, the concept of energy is subsidiary to the 
dynamical description of a system; in Timpson’s terms, it is an adventitious concept 
designed to measure the capacity of a system to perform a certain task −work−. 
However, in the framework of physics as a whole, it acquired its own, not merely 
adventitious, reference, and became one of the fundamental physical concepts. The 
words of William Thomson in the nineteenth century already express clearly this 
transformation: “The very name energy, though first used in its present sense by Dr. 
Thomas Young about the beginning of this century, has only come into use practically 
                                                 
4
 This is not the only movement in the evolution of physics; in certain cases, properties applied to a 
single object become relations. 
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after the doctrine which defines it had […] been raised from a mere formula of 
mathematical dynamics to the position it now holds of a principle pervading all nature 
and guiding the investigator in every field of science” (Thomson 1881, p. 475). At 
present, the word ‘energy’ does not refer to something concrete: if a perturbation in a 
physical medium is transmitted between two points of space, nothing material is 
transmitted; nevertheless, there is transference of energy between those points. And 
although sometimes it is still used as a property name, in general energy has acquired a 
substantial nature −in the Aristotelian sense− that plays a central unifying role in 
physics: energy is a magnitude essentially referred to by absolutely all present-day 
physical theories; it is conceived as something that can be generated, accumulated, 
stored, processed, converted from one form to another, and transmitted from one place 
to another. 
In his insistence on depriving information of physical nature, Timpson says that 
“Quantum information theory and quantum computation are theories about what we 
can do using physical systems” (Timpson 2004, p. 33; emphasis in the original). 
Following with the analogy with energy, one can say that the concept of energy also 
began as a tool to describe what we can do with physical systems. However, its status 
gradually changed with the historical development of physics: now energy is an 
undoubtedly physical item which, although non-material, plays an essential role in 
physical sciences. In the light of the strong presence of the concept of information in 
present-day physics, it is not difficult to suppose that it is following a historical 
trajectory analogous to that followed by the concept of energy in the nineteenth century. 
Summing up, it is quite clear that the world described by contemporary physics is 
not a world of material individuals and stuffs. This traditional ontology was superseded 
by the world of quantum field theory, where particles lose any classical feature and 
fields become substantial items (see, e.g., Kuhlmann 2010), and by the general 
relativistic universe, where energy acquires a sort of “materiality” and space-time is no 
longer a neutral container of material things (see, e.g., Earman 1989). Once one admits 
that it is physics and not grammar that decides if an item is physical or not, it is clear 
that it does not matter what kinds of words are used to refer to properties, such as 
charge and mass, and to name items that acquired substantiality through the history of 
science, such as fields and energy. What only matters is that all those items inhabit the 
world of physics, that is, according to physics they are part of the furniture of the world. 
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And this implies that contemporary physics offers no grounds to deny the possibility of 
a meaningful physical interpretation of the concept of information. 
6.- The many faces of information 
Timpson considers that there is a single correct interpretation of the technical concept of 
information (or, at least, of Shannon’s concept) and, for this reason, he devotes a great 
effort to elucidate it. This “monist” view contrasts with the “pluralist” perspective 
adopted by Shannon when claiming that “[t]he word ‘information’ has been given 
different meanings by various writers in the general field of information theory. [...] It is 
hardly to be expected that a single concept of information would satisfactorily account 
for the numerous possible applications of this general field.” (Shannon 1993, 180). If 
this pluralistic stance was worthy of consideration in Shannon’s times, at present it is 
even more plausible given the fact that the concept of information has permeated almost 
all the domains of science. From this perspective, it is philosophically interesting to 
realize that there are different interpretations of the concept of information, each useful 
in a different specific context. 
Once the focus is on non-semantic information, the first step consists in 
specifying the formal context that frames the discussion about the meaning of the 
concept of information. In fact, although Shannon’s theory is the traditional formalism 
to quantify information, it is not the only one. For instance, Fisher information measures 
the dependence of a random variable X on an unknown parameter θ upon which the 
probability of X depends (Fisher 1925), and algorithmic information measures the 
length of the shortest program that produces a string on a universal Turing machine 
(Chaitin 1987). In quantum information theory, von Neumann entropy gives a measure 
of the quantum resources necessary to faithfully encode the state of the source-system 
(Schumacher 1995). 
It might be supposed that, when confined to a particular formal framework, the 
meaning of the word ‘information’ becomes clear and unequivocal: given the 
mathematical theory, information is what this theory describes. However, this is not the 
case. Even on the basis of the same formalism, there may be different interpretations of 
the concept of information. Although disagreements may arise regarding any formalism, 
let us consider Shannon’s theory. 
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A concept usually connected with the notion of information is that of knowledge: 
information provides knowledge, modifies the state of knowledge of those who receive 
it. As pointed out above, Timpson believes that the link between information and 
knowledge is a feature of the everyday notion of information, which must be carefully 
distinguished from Shannon’s technical concept. However, the idea of knowledge is 
present also in the philosophical and the physical discourse about information. In fact, it 
is common to find authors who even define information in terms of knowledge. For 
instance, taking Shannon’s theory as the underlying formalism for his proposal, Fred 
Dretske says: “information is a commodity that, given the right recipient, is capable of 
yielding knowledge.” (1981, p. 47). According to Donald MacKay, information is 
related to an increase in knowledge on the destination end: “Suppose we begin by asking 
ourselves what we mean by information. Roughly speaking, we say that we have gained 
information when we know something now that we didn't know before; when ‘what we 
know’ has changed.” (1969, p. 10). 
The strong presence of the notion of knowledge is not confined to the works of 
those who try to add semantic content to statistical information. Some authors devoted 
to special sciences are also persuaded that the core meaning of the concept of 
information, even in its technical sense, is linked to the concept of knowledge. In this 
trend, Jon M. Dunn defines information as “what is left of knowledge when one takes 
away believe, justification and truth” (2001, p. 423), and for Bertram Brookes, 
knowledge is “a structure of concepts linked by their relations”, with information 
defined as “a small part of that structure” (1981, p. 131). Also physicists frequently 
speak about what we know or may know when dealing with information. For instance, 
Anton Zeilinger even equates information and knowledge when he says that “[w]e have 
knowledge, i.e., information, of an object only through observation” (1999, p. 633) or, 
with Časlav Bruckner, “[f]or convenience we will use here not a measure of information 
or knowledge, but rather its opposite, a measure of uncertainty or entropy.” (2009, pp. 
681-682). In a traditional textbook about Shannon’s theory applied to engineering it can 
also be read that information “is measured as a difference between the state of 
knowledge of the recipient before and after the communication of information.” (Bell 
1957, p. 7), and that it must be relativized with respect to the background knowledge 
available before the transmission: “the datum point of information is then the whole 
body of knowledge possessed at the receiving end before the communication.” (ibid., p. 
7). In certain cases, the epistemic interpretation of information is what served as the 
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basis for philosophically motivated attempts to add a semantic dimension to a formal 
theory of information (MacKay 1969; Nauta 1972; Dretske 1981). 
It is worth noting that, from the epistemic perspective, the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge about the source of information by consulting the state of the destination is 
rooted in the nomic connection between them, that is, in the lawfulness of the 
regularities underlying the whole situation. In fact, the conditional probabilities that 
define the channel do not represent merely de facto correlations; they are determined by 
a network of lawful connections between the states of the source and the states of the 
destination. 
A different view about information is that which detaches the concept from the 
notion of knowledge and considers information as a physical magnitude. This is the 
position of many physicists (see, e.g., Rovelli 1996) and most engineers, for whom the 
essential feature of information consists in its capacity to be generated at one point of 
the physical space and transmitted to another point; it can also be accumulated, stored 
and converted from one form to another. In this case, the capability of providing 
knowledge is not a central issue, since the transmission of information can be used only 
for control purposes, such as operating a device at the destination end by modifying the 
state of the source. According to this view, it is precisely because of the physical nature 
of information that the dynamics of its flow is constrained by physical laws and facts: 
“Information handling is limited by the laws of physics and the number of parts 
available in the universe” (Landauer 1991, p. 29; see also Bennett and Landauer 1985). 
In general, the physical interpretation of information appears strongly linked with 
the idea expressed by the well-known dictum ‘no information without representation’: 
the transmission of information between two points of the physical space necessarily 
requires an information-bearing signal, that is, a physical process propagating from one 
point to the other. Landauer is an explicit defender of this position when he claims that 
“[i]nformation is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical 
representation. It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole 
in a punched card, a mark on a paper, or some other equivalent.” (1996, p. 188). This 
view is also adopted by some philosophers of science; for instance, Peter Kosso states 
that “information is transferred between states through interaction.” (1989, p. 37). The 
need of a carrier signal sounds natural in the light of the generic idea that physical 
influences can only be transferred through interactions. On this basis, information is 
conceived by many physicists as a physical entity with the same ontological status as 
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energy; it has also been claimed that its essential property is the power to manifest itself 
as structure when added to matter (Stonier 1990, 1996). 
The difference between the epistemic and the physical interpretations of 
information is not merely nominal, but may yield different conclusions regarding 
certain common physical situations. For instance, in the important philosophical 
tradition that explains scientific observation in terms of information (Shapere 1982, 
Brown 1987, Kosso 1989), the way in which information is conceived leads to very 
different consequences regarding observation. This turns out to be particularly clear in 
the so-called ‘negative experiments’ (see Jammer 1974), in which it is assumed that an 
object or event has been observed by noting the absence of some other object or event. 
From the informational view of scientific observation, observation without a direct 
physical interaction between the observed object and an appropriate destination is only 
admissible from an epistemic interpretation of information. According to a physical 
interpretation, by contrast, detection at the destination end does not amount to the 
observation of the object: the presence of the object is only inferred (see Lombardi 
2004). It is interesting to wonder whether taking into account the distinction between 
the epistemic and the physical interpretations of information could contribute to unravel 
the puzzles involved in the informational interpretation of quantum entanglement, in 
particular, of teleportation (see Timpson 2006). 
This presentation of the difference between the epistemic and the physical 
interpretations of Shannon information may suggest that the two interpretations are rival 
and, as a consequence, it is necessary to decide for one of them. Nevertheless, as it will 
be argued in the next section, this is not necessarily the case. 
7.- Information: formalism and interpretations 
Although the physical interpretation of information prevailed in the traditional 
textbooks used for engineers’ training, this situation has changed in recent times: in 
general, present-day textbooks introduce information theory from a formal perspective, 
with no mention of transmitters, receivers or signals, and the basic concepts are 
explained in terms of random variables and probability distributions over their possible 
values. Only when the formalism has been presented, is the theory applied to the 
traditional case of communication. A clear example of this trend is the extensively used 
book by Thomas Cover and Joy Thomas, where the authors emphasize that: 
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“Information theory answers two fundamental questions in communication theory […]. 
For this reason some consider information theory to be a subset of communication 
theory. We will argue that it is much more. Indeed, it has fundamental contributions to 
make in statistical physics […], computer sciences […], statistical inference […] and to 
probability and statistics.” (1991, p. 1). 
The idea that the concept of information is completely formal is not new. Already 
Aleksandr Khinchin (1957) and Fazlollah Reza (1961) conceived information theory as 
a new chapter of the theory of probability. From this perspective, Shannon information 
not only is not a physical magnitude, but also loses its nomic ingredient: the mutual 
information between two random variables can be defined even if there is no lawful 
relationship between them and the conditional probabilities connecting them express 
only de facto correlations. 
If the concept of information is purely formal and belongs to a mathematical 
theory, the word ‘information’ does not pertain to the language of empirical sciences 
−or to any referential language−: it has no extralinguistic reference in itself. Its 
“meaning” has only a syntactic dimension. According to this view, the generality of the 
concept of Shannon information derives from its exclusively formal nature; and this 
generality is what makes it a powerful formal tool for empirical science, applicable to a 
wide variety of fields. 
From this formal perspective, the relationship between the word ‘information’ and 
the different views about the nature of information is the logical relationship between a 
mathematical object and its interpretations, each one of which endows the term with a 
specific referential content. The epistemic view, then, is one of the many different 
interpretations, which may be applied in different technical domains, for example, in the 
attempts to ground a theory of knowledge on informational bases (Dretske 1981), or in 
psychology and cognitive sciences to conceptualize the human abilities of acquiring 
knowledge (see, e.g., Hoel, Albantakis and Tononi 2013). 
At the same time, the physical view, which turns information into a physical 
magnitude carried by signals, is appropriate for communication theory, in which the 
main problem consists in optimizing the transmission of information by means of 
physical bearers whose energy and bandwidth is constrained by technological and 
economic limitations. But this is not the only possible physical interpretation: if the 
source S is interpreted as a system in a macrostate compatible with many equiprobable 
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microstates, ( )I S  represents the Boltzmann entropy of S. Furthermore, in computer 
sciences, if S is interpreted as a binary string of finite length, ( )I S  can be related with 
the algorithmic complexity of S. Perhaps a kind of physical interpretation is also 
adequate in molecular biology, where the language of information became ubiquitous, 
starting from the work of James Watson and Francis Crick in the fifties (see, e.g., 
Maynard Smith 2000), and even in evolutionary biology, where it has been argued that 
abstract patterns in evolutionary processes can be described using informational 
concepts (Harms 2004). 
Summing up, from a perspective that conceives the concept of information −in the 
context of Shannon’s theory− as a formal concept, the epistemic and the physical 
interpretations are no longer rival, but they rather become two of the several possible 
interpretations of that formal concept. Of course, this pluralist strategy does not solve by 
itself the many problems involved in the widespread use of informational notions in 
most fields of science. However, the clear differentiation between the several 
interpretations of information is a first step towards overcoming those obstacles based 
in misunderstandings that prevent conceptual agreements. 
8.- Conclusions 
The concept of information is one of the most elusive in the context of present-day 
philosophy of science, not only due to its abstract character, but also because it appears 
in multiple and varied scientific disciplines. It is for this reason that the philosophical 
analysis of its meaning and scope is nowadays an urgent task. In this sense, the works of 
Timpson constitute an outstanding contribution to the field, since they have brought to 
the fore many aspects of the concept of information: the domain of application of 
Shannon’s theory (Timpson 2003), the relation between information transmission and 
quantum entanglement (Timpson 2005), the interpretation of teleportation (Timpson 
2006), the nature of quantum information and its relation with the interpretations of 
quantum mechanics (Timpson 2008, 2013), among others. Nevertheless, the 
acknowledgement of the high value of his work does not amount to uncritical agreement. 
In this article we have focused, in particular, on Timpson’s elucidation of the 
concept of information, according to which ‘information’ is an abstract noun and, as a 
consequence, information is not part of the physical contents of the world. Here we 
proposed a strategy in a certain sense opposed to that of Timpson: instead of attempting 
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to cut the Gordian knot of the meaning of ‘information’ by means of a notion almost 
empty of referential content, we embrace a pluralist stance, which recognizes the 
legitimacy of different interpretations of the concept of information, not mutually 
exclusive and each useful in a specific context. 
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